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Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, how
goes the time?
The PRESIDING OFF!~. The
Senator from Montana has 6 minutes
remaining and the Senator from Pennsylvania has 3 minutes remaining.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield myself as much time as I may require within the 6 minutes.
Mr. Presjdent, so far as I am aware,
not a Member of this body, to my knowledge, has spoken during this floor debate
againl!lt extending the vr;>t!ng franchise to
those 18 and above. There is a great deal
of concern about the proper way to
achieve this objective. Some persons
think, very honestly, that the only way
is through the constitutional process.
Others think it is by statute.
There has been a lot of talk this morning about the Randolph constitutional
amendment resolution, with 74 or 75
signatures, which now resides within the
confines of the Judiciary Committee.
There has been some talk, encouraging at
least on the surface, that if we do not
do anything about this, or let it slide
by, It will not be long before the Randolph resolution will be reported out of
the Judiciary Committee.
Frankly, I doubt that It will be reported
shortly, under the very best of circumstances. Frankly, I know, as far as the
House Judiciary Committee Is concerned,
no action will be taken this year, any
more than was taken in previous years.
So what we are going to do if we do
not face up to this Issue on this basis, not
only for this year but perhaps for years
to come, is forgo the possibility of a constitutional amendment which will put
into effeet what every Member of this
body desires, at least as far as I am
awa.re--Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. AIKEN. I wonder if perhaps the
Senator feels that if the amendment is
defeated today the defeat will be taken
as the sentiment of this body, and perhaps the constitutional amendment proposal will never come out of the Judiciary Committee at all, since the interpretation will be that the Senate has
already voted against It, and so why
bother?
Mr. MANSFIELD. That Is correct. It Is
a good burial grow1d for certain types of
legislation, and I do not think we ought
to try to bUnk away the facts.
What we have now is the first chance
and the only chance that I can recall, on
a na.tlonal scale, tor this Institution to
face up to this Issue squarely,
This amendment would extend the
right to vote to every citizen of the
United States who is 18 years old and
older. It would afford that right in every
election, Federal, state, or local.
Much has been said lately about extending the franchise by statute. It Is
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argued by those that oppose this method
that Congress does not have the power
to act; only the Supreme Court can make
those fine constitutional distinctions.
The Supreme Court is the final arbiter
of these questions, but lt is about time
that Congress assumed lts responsibilities
as well.
In an effort to determine the limits·
of Congress' constitutional authority,
I sent a telegram to Prof. Paul Freund,
probably the best constitutional laWYer
in this country. In addition, I looketi up
the testimony of the former Solicitor
General of the United States, Archibald
Cox, talked to other people, and have
received information which, to my way
of thinking, as a nonlawYer, validates
the procedure which we are following
and does insure a possible way by means
of which the 18-year-olds and above can
achieve the right to vote.
At 18, 19, and 20, young people are In
the forefront of the political processworking, listening, talking, participating.
They are barred from voting.
I do not think they do enough talking.
I do not think they do enough infiltrating into the established political
parties. I think those of us above the age
of 30 could stand a little educating from
these youngsters-not the minuscule minority that always gets the publicity, but
the conscientious, idealistic majority of
young men and~ women who could bring
our parties some new blood, some new
vigor, some new ideas. Both parties could
stand a pretty strong transfusion.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. If I may finish, first.
I am on a tight schedule here.
They- will not only bring us a fresh
outlook, but will bring w their innovation, and will do what they can through
acts of participation, to become a part
of the whole, rather than on the outside,
as is the case at the present tlme.
They fight our wars. You can brush
aside that argument all you want, but
that is a most important argument, and
I think these youngsters who are called
because of our responsibility, because we
have laid down the policy, should have
a right, at least in some small part, to
influence -the setting of that policy.
They are eligible to be treated as adults
in the courts, in both civil and criminal
actions. They marry at 18. They have
children. They pay taxes. The hold
down full-time jobs.
So I would hope that the Senate would
approve the ballot for the 18-year-olds
at this time, in this fashion, and on this,
the voting measure to which it is germane. As a political forecaster, I possess
no extraordinary capacities. But I am
aware of the public reports by some in
opposition to the extension of voting
rights-b~ any method-to 18-year-olds.
I know that some who have spoken out
are in a position to thwart the efforts of
the congressional proponents of this proposal. So this amendment on this bill
will be, in my opinion, the only chance
the Congress will have of enacting this
proposal. Either it becomes law on this
bill, or it Is dead for this Congress. ·
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the REcORD with my remarks a letter
which I received from Prof. Paul A.
Freund of Stanford University under
date of March 5, 1970.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the REcoRD,
as follows:
CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY IN
THE BEHAVIOB.AL 8crENCE!I,
Stanford, Calif., March 5, 1970.

Hon. MicHAEL J. MANSFIELD,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MANsFIELD: I greatly appreciate your telegram Inviting me to elaborate on the opinion which I expressed in
an address in June 1968, that Congress might,
by statute, lower the voting age tor state
and Federal elections to the age of eighteen.
The Constitution of 1787 left the question
of suffrage basically to the several states. In
Article I, section 2, It Is provided that the
el.e ctors In each state for the House of Representatives "shall have the qualifications
requisite for electors of the most numerous
branch of the state legislature." Article I,
section 4, provides that the times, places and
manner of holding elections tor Senators and
Representatives shall be prescribed In each
state. Congress Is given the power by law
to make or alter such regulations. My opinIon does not at all rest on the last clause
Although "manner" has been given a generous construction to Include, tor example,
Federal corrupt practices Iaws applicable to
national elections, the specific provl.slon on
"qualifications" in the earlier section would
rule out any effort to absorb the requirement of a minimum age for voting Into the
"manner" of holding such elections. And so
it the text of 1787 stood alone there would
appear to be no basts for the legiSlative
proposal.
But that original text does not stand alone.
Th& Pciurteenth Amendment, with Its
guarantee of equal protection of the I.e.ws (no
less than the Fifteenth, prohibiting specifically dlsqual!ftcat!ons based · on race or
color) introduced a vital glbss on the authority of the states, namely that unreasonable classifications by law are unacceptable.
This general standard applies to the laws of
suffrage no less than to other !aWE, despite
the !act that racial disqualifications are
treated spoolfically In the Fifteenth Amendment. It Is much too late to question this
force ot the Fourteenth Amendment In this
area. Indeed, the first of the so-called white
primary caaes was decided on the 'basts of
the Fourteenth rather than the Fifteenth.
AB Justice Reed later pointed out, "Without
consideration of the Fifteenth, this Court
held that the action of Texas In denying the
ballot to Negroes by statute was In violation
of the equal protection clause of "the Fourteenth Amendment,'' Smtth v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 658 (1944), referring to Ntxon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). The whole line
of reapportionment cases rests on the appllca,b1llty of the equal-protection guarantee to
the suffrage; and surely religious qualifications. which are Impermissible for otl!cehold!ng, would be equally forp!dden !or vottnwtn llgbt of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Tbe essentla:l question, then, Is whether
Congress, In Its power and responsibility to
enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment, may properly conclude that the
exclusion from the suffrage of those between
18 and 21 years of age now constitutes an
unreasonable discrimination. That tb!s Is a
judgment for the Congress to make Is plain
from the origina-l conception of the Fourteenth Amendment and from recent decisions under lt. Section 6 of tbat Amendment,
empowering Congress to enforce Its prov!-
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slon.s "by approp riat e legislation," was regarded as the cutting edge of the Amendment. It was expected that Congress would
supply the substantive content for the deliberately general standards of equal protection, due process, and pr ivileges and Immunities.
Recent decisions have emphasized t he propriety, Indeed the responsibility, o! Congressional action In the area of voting right s . 1n
1966, as you know, Congress enacted a provision of the Voting Rights Act that overrode
state requirement s of l!teracy In Engllsh,
where a person had received a sixt h-grade
education In another language In a school
under the American fiag. It was argued, tn
contesting the Federal law, that Congress
could so provide only If the English-literacy
reqttlrement were regarded by the Court Itself as In violation of the equal-protection
guarant y of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Upholding the Federal law, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the judgment of unreasonable discrimination was one that Congress had appropriately made for ltsel!, and
that Its judgment would be upheld unless
It were it self an unreasonable one. Any other view of the Court's function, said the
Court. "would depreciate botb Congressional
resourcefulness and Congressional responsiblllty for Implementing the Amendment.
It would confine the legislative power tn
this context to the Insignificant role of
abrogating only those state laws that the
judicial branch Wll8 prepared to adjudge
unconstit utional, or of merely Informing the
judgment of the Judiciary by particularizing
t he 'majest ic generalltles' of section 1 of the
Amendment." "[I] Is enough," the Court
added, "that we perceive a basts upon which
Congress might predicate a judgment that
t he appllcatlon of New York's literacy requirement . .. constituted an Invidious discrimination In violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U .S. 641, 648-649 (1966).
The Supreme Court has held, In f. six-tothree decision, that the poll tax as a condition of voting In stat e elections Is unconst!tuJtlonal even without a Congressional
judgment on ·the matter. Harper v. Virginia
Board Of Elect i ons, 388 U.S. era ( 1966) .
Whether or not one agrees wltb that decision,
for present purposes the case has a twofold
significance. The first relates to the dissentIng opinions. Justice Black, protesting
against the "activism" of tbe majority (as
others have termed It). went on to say, "I
have no doubt at all that Congress has the
power under section 5 to pa.s8 legislation to
abolish the poll tax In order to protect the
citizens of this country t! It be!leves that
the poll tax Is being used as a device to deny
voters the equal protection of the laws .. .
But this leg!sla,tive power which was granted
to Congress by section 5 o! the Fourteenth
Amendmen.t Is lmlted to Congress . . . For
Congress to do this fit s In precisely with the
division of powerfil originally entrusted to the
three branches of government--Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial." Id. at 679-680.
The other dissenters, Justices Harlan and
Stewart, referred to the possible authority of
Congress and said that they "Intimate no
view on that question." Id. at 680, n . 2. Thus
It Is entirely possible that bad Congress !tselt
acted, the decision might have been unanimous.
The second point of significance In the
poll-tax case Is the bearing of the constitutional amending power. There was then in
effect, of course, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. a,bol!sh!ng poll taxes In relation to
Federal elections. Both the majority and
mlnorlt~ opinions show that Congressional
authority 1s not precluded because the subject might be committed, indeed had been
committed, to the amending process.
It could be asked whether, on the bas'
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of the views refl.ected here. IL was actua.lly
necesaa.ry to have achieved woman auffra.ge
through a constltutlonR.l amendment. At the
time o! the Nineteenth Amendment the
power o! Congress to enforce the equalprotection guaranty was In a dormant sta.te.
The alternatives were thought of as a judicial decision striking down exclusively male
suffrage, or an amendment to the Constitution. In retrospect, tt seems tolerably clear
that from the standpoint of constitutional
power (putting aside considerations of poUtleal expediency), Congress could have determined by law that exclusion from voting on
the basis o! sex was an unwarranted differentiation .
The question !or Congress Is essentially
the same, whether the exclusion be on criteria of sex, residence, literacy, or age. It Is
not my purpose to review the considerations
that have been brought forward In favor of
reducing the voting age. They Involve a judgment whether twent y-one has become an
unreasonable line of demarcation In light of
the level of education attained by younger
persons, their Involvement In polltlcn.l discussion, their capacity In many cases to
marry, their criminal respons1bll1ty, their
obllgatlon for compulsory mll1tary service.
Historically, we are told, twenty-one was
fixed es the age of majority because a young
man was deemed to have become capable at
that age of bearing the heavy armor of a
knight.
The cummula.tlve effect of such considerations on the continued reasonableness of
twenty-one as a minimum voting wm, I am
sure, be canvassed by the Congress. My purpose, responsive to your Invitation, has been
to Indicate why I belleve that Congress may
properly make such a judgment and embody
It In the form of a statute.
Yours very sincerely,
PAUL A. FREUND,
Profe!sor, Harvard. Law School.
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